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ABSTRACT
The Impact of State and Trait Anxiety on Performance in a Source Monitoring Task
Kristina M. Kania

This study examined the impact of state anxiety (current emotional state) and trait anxiety
(predisposition) on a source monitoring task. The unique question asked in this study was
whether highly anxious people who are distressed following a stressful to-be-remembered event
are better at source monitoring. Seventy-two undergraduates completed a measure of anxiety and
then either received an anxious mood (n = 36) or mood stabilizing (n = 36) induction before
viewing to-be-source monitored material. Participants then completed a source identification
task in which they were asked to identify the source of the to-be-source monitored information.
Participants high in state anxiety were more accurate on the source identification task. The main
effect of trait anxiety and the state-trait anxiety interaction were nonsignificant. Neither state nor
trait anxiety impacted accuracy on misleading information items presented within the source
identification task.
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The Impact of State and Trait Anxiety on Performance in a Source Monitoring Task
Anxiety and Memory
People are often victims or witnesses to criminal activity. Understanding the factors that
impact accurate reports of crime-related events is therefore important. A large body of research
exists on memory for emotional events (see Reisburg & Heuer, 2007, for a review). However,
little research has examined how people with anxiety remember stressful events. In the real
world, people are likely to become anxious when witnessing a crime. Therefore, it is important to
determine whether people high and low in anxiety would remember the crime similarly. This
research question motivated the proposed study. In the current study, the anxious mood
induction will occur prior to the to-be-remembered event. This is considered to be advantageous
over having a stressful event as the to-be-remembered event because memory for portions of the
to-be-remembered event before and after people recognize the stressful nature of the event may
be impacted differently.
Researchers have theorized that anxiety will impact memory (See Becker, Roth, Andrich,
& Margraf, 1999; Wenzel & Holt, 2002). More specifically, people with anxiety are theorized to
attend to threatening information due to the existence of hypothesized danger-related schemata,
which guide their attentional processes when the schemata are activated (Beck & Emery, 1979).
Therefore, people with anxiety are expected to show better memory for threatening information
or information that activates their anxiety than people without anxiety (See McCabe, 1999).
That is, anxious individuals are expected to show a memory bias (i.e., superior memory) for
anxiety-related information compared to nonanxious individuals. Attention to threat-related
information is more likely to occur during physiological arousal (See Coles, Turk, & Heimberg,
2007).
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Other researchers theorize relations between anxiety and cognitive processes which
including memory. According to Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) processing efficiency theory,
processing efficiency is deficient in people with high anxiety due to their resources being utilized
towards worry rather than towards the task at hand. Highly anxious people have been shown to
increase their effort towards a task in order to prevent problems they foresee probably
happening. Along with this, worry increases motivation, which leads to greater performance
(Eysenck & Calvo, 1992).
Empirical studies support the theory that people with anxiety disorders display memory
biases for threatening information. For example, in a study examining memory biases in panic
disordered individuals, Becker, Roth, Andrich, and Margraf (1999) found that, compared to the
control participants, the panic disordered participants displayed a memory bias for panic
disorder-relevant words. That is, panic disordered participants remembered more words
associated with bodily symptoms (i.e., palpitations, constriction) than did control participants;
however, both groups remembered neutral and positive words equally, ruling out a general bias
toward emotional words.
Different types of anxiety disorders, including social anxiety disorder, have been studied
in relation to memory biases. Individuals with social anxiety have also been shown to exhibit
memory biases for negative information about oneself, possibly due to their fear of evaluation
from others. Selectively remembering negative information about oneself may be connected to
negative self-evaluations and a lack of self-reinforcement for social interactions, which could
maintain a person’s anxiety about social situations (O’Banion & Arkowitz, 1977). In this study,
researchers asked women who were high in social anxiety and women who were low in social
anxiety to interact individually with a confederate. They then received positive or negative

3

feedback in the form of descriptions about how the confederate felt about them. O’Banion and
Arkowitz (1977) hypothesized that women who were given positive descriptions from the
confederate would recall more positive information about themselves than the women who were
given negative descriptions. The results showed that women who were rated high in social
anxiety remembered negative descriptions of themselves better than did women who were rated
low in social anxiety. The two groups did not differ on their memory of positive selfdescriptions, demonstrating that social anxiety may be mediated and maintained by this selective
memory for negative information about oneself (O’Banion & Arkowitz, 1977).
In a second study that examined memory biases in people with social anxiety, Wenzel
and Holt (2002) provided socially anxious individuals and non-anxious control individuals with
written stimuli with evaluative threat-related words and neutral words. Their results, in support
of their hypotheses, showed that the socially anxious participants remembered more of the
evaluative threat material than the neutral material and recalled more threat-related words than
the non-anxious control participants (Wenzel & Holt, 2002).
People with Generalized Anxiety Disorder also are expected to exhibit memory biases.
Coles and colleagues (2007) conducted the first study on memory biases in persons with
Generalized Anxiety Disorder using personally-relevant threatening words. Participants were
diagnosed with Generalized Anxiety Disorder based on the Anxiety Disorders Interview
Schedule for DSM-IV: Lifetime Version. Control participants did not meet criteria for any
current or past Axis I disorders. Participants were given a list of 80 words: 40 Generalized
Anxiety Disorder-related threat words, 20 neutral words, and 20 GAD-related positive words.
They rated each word on a Likert-scale ranging from -3 = “extremely negative for me” to +3 =
“extremely positive for me.” The words to be remembered were chosen for each participant
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based on his/her ratings to ensure relevance for each participant. The participants completed an
incidental learning task, which means that the participants were not aware that they would be
tested on their memory for the material at a later point. The task required participants to view
words they previously rated as threatening, neutral, and positive; to imagine themselves in a
situation involving each word; and then to rate how easy or difficult it was to imagine the scene.
The participants then completed a 5-minute non-verbal filler task, which had them complete
patterns presented to them visually. Next, the participants completed a stem-completion task to
measure implicit memory. The task required participants to look at the first three letters of a
word and complete the word with the first letters that came to mind. Finally, the participants
completed a free recall task that required them to write down as many words as they could
remember from the incidental learning task. The researchers found that participants with
Generalized Anxiety Disorder remembered more threatening words, demonstrating a memory
bias, and rated the threatening words as being more negative than did the nonanxious controls
(Coles et al., 2007).
Evidence of a memory bias in anxious individuals may depend on the extent to which a
person is high or low in trait anxiety. Specifically, McCabe (1999) wanted to determine if
selective memory for threat, as is shown in panic-disordered patients, only occurs after an
unexpected panic attack or if it is related to the anxiety sensitivity level of the individual and
whether it is more pronounced when arousal is high. She examined memory biases in people
with high trait anxiety and in people with low-trait anxiety, as measured by the Anxiety
Sensitivity Index, specifically focusing on selective memory for anxiety-related words (e.g.,
palpitation, fearful) and general threat words (e.g., explosion, poison). The design of this study
included positive words (e.g., optimistic, pleasant) to control for a bias in emotional words.
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Neutral words (e.g., oven, bench) were also included to serve as a baseline measure of memory.
Participants were first randomly assigned to the high-arousal and low-arousal conditions. They
were then shown words and asked to rate the extent to which they liked or disliked the word on a
7-point Likert scale, ranging from -3 (strongly dislike) to +3 (strongly like). Six neutral words
were included to control for primacy and recency effects and the remainder of the words
included 24 positive words, 24 neutral words, 24 anxiety-related, and 24 general threat words.
The participants in the high-arousal condition then participated in a hyperventilation task and the
participants in the low-arousal condition participated in a relaxation task. Participants in both
groups then completed measures evaluating their anxiety levels. Following this, participants
completed a word stem completion task to measure implicit memory. Next, they completed a
cued recall test to measure explicit memory. Finally, participants completed measures, including
the ASI (McCabe, 1999).
McCabe (1999) used a 2 (Group: High Anxiety, Low Anxiety) X 2 (Arousal: High
Arousal, Low Arousal) ANOVA. The results indicate a memory bias in people with high trait
anxiety for general threat words, but not for anxiety-related words. People with high trait
anxiety also evaluated the words to be significantly more negative than did people with low trait
anxiety. People with low trait anxiety remembered more positive words, suggesting that they
attend to positive information more than people with high trait anxiety. Greater attention to
positive stimuli is thought to be a protective factor preventing people from developing anxiety.
Although analyses revealed that the arousal manipulation was successful, arousal level did not
impact memory performance. There was no effect of state anxiety on memory (McCabe, 1999).
Effects of Anxiety on Memory for Nonthreatening Stimulus Material
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Additional studies have examined the impact of anxiety on memory for nonthreatening
stimulus materials. Kaye, Kirschner, and Mandler (1953) examined the effect of test anxiety in
adults, as measured by an anxiety questionnaire designed to specifically measure test anxiety
(See Sarason & Mandler, 1952), on memory for number series, mixed letter and number series,
and short word series in a group testing situation. Participants were split into high- and lowanxiety groups and told that they were going to take the working memory portion of the IQ test
and receive their scores shortly afterward. The low-anxiety participants scored higher on the test
than did the high-anxiety participants.
State Anxiety Induction
Anxiety induction has been utilized in studies examining an individual’s accuracy on an
eyewitness task to observe the differential effects of anxiety levels on eyewitness memory.
Dobson and Markham (1992) induced anxiety in 120 undergraduate psychology students using
evaluative threat to increase state anxiety at encoding, at retrieval, at both encoding and retrieval,
or at neither point. They hypothesized that participants who were in a high state of anxiety at
both encoding and retrieval would be less accurate on an eyewitness task than would lowanxious participants. They also hypothesized that inducing evaluative threat during their state
anxiety induction during retrieval would decrease the high-anxious participants’ accuracy, but
would not negatively impact low-anxious participants’ accuracy. Participants were told they
were going to view some slides that they would later be asked about. State anxiety was induced
via telling the participants in two high anxiety groups and two low anxiety groups that their
performance on the task was directly related to intelligence; highly correlated with their
academic success; and their performance would be compared to their peers’ performances. First,
participants viewed slides showing an incident of purse-grabbing and the events that occurred
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before and after that incident. Second, participants completed a questionnaire for 20 minutes
regarding their opinions about crime and punishment. The group that was assigned to experience
the state anxiety induction only at encoding was then told that they were not going to be being
evaluated during the following recognition task. Next, participants either received anxietyinducing instructions if they were in the experimental groups assigned to receive the state anxiety
induction at retrieval or at both encoding and retrieval, or participants received control
instructions. Finally, the participants answered 30 multiple-choice questions about the slides
they viewed (Dobson & Markham, 1992).
Dobson and Markham’s (1992) results, in support of their hypothesis, showed that lowanxious participants were more accurate on the eyewitness task than were the high-anxious
participants when state anxiety was induced at both encoding and retrieval. The performance of
the high-anxious participants and low-anxious participants did not differ significantly in the
remaining three conditions. Low-anxious participants were more accurate on the eyewitness task
when they experienced the state anxiety induction at encoding and retrieval than they did in the
control condition. High-anxious participants did not differ significantly on their memory
accuracy in the state anxiety induction condition from in the control condition. Furthermore,
their findings support the idea that the interaction of individual and situational variables plays an
important role on eyewitness accuracy (Dobson & Markham, 1992).
In sum, the previously described studies show that higher levels of anxiety are associated
with lower levels of recall.

Anxiety and Suggestibility
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Research shows that memory and suggestibility are related. The memory trace strength
theory of suggestibility states that stronger memories are more resistant to suggestibility. A
memory will gain strength with greater exposure to an event or item (Pezdek & Roe, 1995).
Ridley and Clifford (2004) examined the impact of state anxiety on suggestibility. They,
like Dobson and Markham (1992), used evaluative threat to induce state anxiety, specifically at
either encoding or retrieval of misleading post-event information, at both encoding and retrieval,
or at neither point. First, the participants completed a visual analogue mood scale (VAMS) in
order to measure state anxiety. Second, they viewed a 3-minute video depicting a kidnapping
scenario. Third, participants completed a second VAMS to measure their state anxiety. Fourth,
they were interviewed individually with either misleading content or with correctly leading
content, without the knowledge that misleading post-event information might be included.
Participants who were assigned to experience the state anxiety induction during encoding and
during both encoding and retrieval were videotaped and watched themselves on a monitor. They
were told that a mock-jury would evaluate their performance. After this, all participants
completed another VAMS to evaluate state anxiety induction or to gather control data.
Participants then completed irrelevant questionnaires to ensure that 15 minutes passed. At this
point, participants who were assigned to experience the state anxiety induction at retrieval went
through the same procedure as the other groups previously experienced. The participants
assigned to experience the state anxiety induction at both encoding and retrieval went through
the same procedure again at this point. Finally, all participants then answered a standard set of
questions and then completed another VAMS (Ridley & Clifford, 2004).
Ridley and Clifford (2004) found that the state anxiety induction was successful and,
therefore, increased levels of anxiety for all participants. An ANOVA was conducted examining
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the anxiety groups separately and combined, but no significant main or interactions effects were
found for memory accuracy. A significant main effect of anxiety on suggestibility in the misled
condition was found. A t-test revealed that the participants in the misinformed condition who
did not experience the state anxiety induction were significantly more suggestible than the other
groups. Implementing a state anxiety induction during encoding, retrieval, or both encoding and
retrieval significantly reduces suggestibility for people who have been misled. This suggests that
state anxiety inductions have an impact on memory accuracy at encoding and/or retrieval when
misleading post-event information is presented (Ridley & Clifford, 2004).
Several studies have examined the question of whether anxiety impacts suggestibility in
children. Ridley, Clifford, and Keogh (2002) hypothesized that children will be suggestible to
misleading information. Supported by Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) processing efficiency theory,
they also predicted that high- and low-state-anxious children would not differ significantly on
correctly leading information, but that they would differ in suggestibility levels on misleading
information. The study design was a 2 (high or low state anxiety) X 2 (misleading or correctly
leading) factorial. They also ran correlations among memory accuracy, suggestibility, state
anxiety, and depression. Eighty-three children were tested in two separate classes at two
separate schools. The classes were randomly assigned to one of the experimental groups
manipulating misleading or correctly leading information. Children whose percentile rank of the
sample for state anxiety was equal to or exceeding 66 were included in the high anxiety group
and children whose percentile rank was equal to or less than 33 were in the low anxiety group.
First, all of the children viewed a 3-minute, 45-second video of a car accident. Second, they
answered questions about the video they viewed, which included misleading information for the
misleading group or correctly leading information for the control group. They ensured that 10
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minutes passed between the second and third steps of the study during which time the children
completed Spielberger’s State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children. Finally, the children
answered questions that were meant to examine the effects of misleading information on their
memories (Ridley et al., 2002).
Ridley et al. (2002) found that state anxiety did not significantly affect the accuracy of
the participants’ memory for correctly leading questions, but that state anxiety led to more
accurate responses to misleading questions in the children. That is, children high in state anxiety
were less suggestible.
Almerigogna, Ost, Bull, and Akehurst (2007) examined whether the combination of state
and trait anxiety, as measured by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children (STAI-C),
influences children’s suggestibility to misleading information when the misleading information
is presented during a memory interview in the form of misleading questions. First, children
completed the STAI-C. Second, the children watched a movie clip from the children’s film
‘Madeline’ in groups of 14-23 people. Next, the children were interviewed individually and
were asked seven non-leading control questions and seven misleading questions about the film
clip they viewed. The experimenters manipulated the interview style, hoping to impact state
anxiety, by having children interviewed by either a supportive or a non-supportive interviewer.
Immediately after the memory interview, children again completed the STAI-C. The nonsupportive interviewer condition was utilized to induce state anxiety in those children. A 2
(Interviewing Style: supportive or non-supportive) X 2 (Measures: memory accuracy and
suggestibility) MANOVA was conducted. An effect was found for interviewing style and
suggestibility scores, with children interviewed in the non-supportive condition providing
significantly more inaccurate answers to misleading questions. There was no effect of
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interviewing style on memory accuracy scores. Next, effects of post-experimental anxiety on
responses to correctly leading and misleading questions were examined. A 4 (Anxiety: high and
low state anxiety and high and low trait anxiety) X 2 (Measures: accuracy, suggestibility)
MANOVA was conducted. Children high in both state and trait anxiety gave more inaccurate
answers to misleading questions than did children low in both state and trait anxiety. High-trait
and high post-interview state anxiety did not significantly affect correct responses to correctly
leading questions. In sum, the results of this study show that state anxiety decreases accurate
responses to misleading questions. Trait anxiety negatively impacts responses to misleading
questions. The combination of high state anxiety and high trait anxiety yields similar findings.
With respect to misleading questions, state anxiety, trait anxiety, and the combination of state
anxiety and trait anxiety do not impact the accuracy of responses to correctly leading questions
(Almerigogna et al., 2007).
Much of the research on anxiety and suggestibility has utilized the Gudjonsson
Suggestibility Scale (Merckelbach et al., 1998). The scale is purported to examine an
individual’s suggestibility. Suggestibility is defined in two ways. First, it is defined as
susceptibility to being influenced by leading questions, known as “Yield.” Second,
suggestibility is defined as susceptibility to changing an answer under pressure, known as “Shift”
(Merckelbach, Muris, Wessel, & van Koppen, 1998). The GSS uses the following procedure:
First, a narrative is read aloud to the participant. Second, the participant verbally recounts as
much as he or she can remember about the passage. Third, the experimenter then asks the
participant a standard set of questions that include misleading questions. Finally, the interviewer
provides negative feedback by convincingly telling the participant that he or she inaccurately
answered several of the questions and has the participant attempt to answer the entire set of
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questions for a final time. The examiner records any changes in the participants’ answers.
Changes in answers are referred to as “Shifts” (Merckelbach et al., 1998). The literature shows
that not every person shifts their answers due to a wide variety of individual differences.
In one such study, Gudjonsson (1988) examined the effects of state anxiety on
suggestibility. First, participants listened to the narrative for the GSS. Second, they completed
the free recall portion of the GSS followed by the Spielberger State Anxiety Inventory (SAI) and
several other questionnaire measures not pertinent to this proposed thesis project. Third, they
provided recall for the narrative after the delay during which they were completing the scales.
Next, participants completed the SAI again in reference to their emotions during the time they
were participating in the GSS interrogation. Finally, they reported any coping skills they had
utilized during the interrogation (Gudjonsson, 1988). Gudjonsson (1988) found that state anxiety
is more closely related to suggestibility than is trait anxiety. This may be due to the fact that
state anxiety, not trait anxiety, is influenced by the immediate context (e.g., interrogative
process). Specifically, Yield 2 (after negative feedback) and Shift scores on the GSS correlate
more strongly with anxiety than do initial scores on the misleading questions. This study found a
moderately high significant correlation between state anxiety and suggestibility, particularly
Yield 2 scores, increasing as state anxiety increased (r = 0.48). In regard to Shift scores, this
correlation was strongest after the individuals with anxiety were given negative feedback (r =
0.69). In sum, after receiving negative feedback, participants with anxiety are more likely to
respond to misleading questions incorrectly and to change their answers to the questions
(Gudjonsson, 1988).

In other words, they are more suggestible.

To observe the relationship between state and trait anxiety and suggestibility, Wolfradt
and Meyer (1998) conducted a study using the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale, in which
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participants with an anxiety disorder were compared to a nonanxious control group. First, the
participants completed the GSS-2 to measure suggestibility. After the immediate recall of the
narrative passage, participants completed the State Trait Anxiety Inventory. The delayed recall
phase of the GSS-2 was not examined due to the investigators’ concern of the clinical population
overexerting themselves. The anxiety disordered participants, who endorsed high levels of state
anxiety (𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 = 54.36, SD = 11.97 vs. 𝑀𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 = 26.78, SD = 2.50) and trait anxiety

(𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 = 57.84, SD = 8.91 vs. 𝑀𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 = 27.38, SD = 3.30), were more suggestible on the
GSS-2 factors of suggestibility Yield, Shift, and total suggestibility than were the control
participants (Wolfradt & Meyer, 1998).
In sum, across studies, anxious individuals in a high state of anxiety were more
suggestible than were the nonanxious controls.
Anxiety and Source Monitoring
According to Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay (1993), source monitoring involves
people making decisions about where they learned specific information, beliefs, and memories as
they are attempting to recall them. The amount of information recalled and the degree to which a
person feels confident in their recollections varies greatly from person to person and even within
a person (i.e., remembering someone’s face, but not how you know them, or remembering that
you were given a piece of information, but cannot recall who gave it to you). The source
monitoring hypothesis states that source monitoring errors occur when a misled person is asked
to recall the source of their information and they mistakenly recall the details of the misleading
information as the details of their experienced event. When a person bases his/her judgment
about the source of their information on the fact that the information presented looks familiar,
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rather than basing his/her judgment on the cues presented about the specific details of the
original event, that person is likely to make source monitoring errors (Johnson et al., 1993).
Johnson et al. (1993) report that an emotional event (i.e., an event that elevates a person’s
state anxiety level) can disturb the encoding process, making it more difficult or impossible for a
person to later recall certain specific details of the original event. Along with this, they also state
that a person who is highly anxious at the time of recall may have more difficulty recalling the
information from the original event, as this can disrupt their source monitoring. Therefore,
individuals are more likely to recall be more accurate in source monitoring if they are not
anxious at the time of recall.
Also concerned with source identification, Ridley and Clifford (2006) conducted a
correlational study where they hypothesized that tasks that require an individual to recall the
source of their memory (source attributions) would increase levels of worry in people with high
trait anxiety, leading to increased effort to respond accurately, which would result in fewer
source misattribution errors. According to Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) processing efficiency
theory, highly anxious people utilize increased effort to accurately complete a task, but it
increases the length of time it takes them to complete the task. Fifty-four undergraduate students
first viewed a 5-minute video showing a burglary and car chase. Second, they completed
questionnaires containing misleading information. Third, the students completed the state and
trait anxiety questionnaires. Next, they completed an irrelevant writing task to ensure that 15
minutes elapsed between the to-be-source monitored information and the source identification
task. Finally, participants completed a source monitoring task for which they were instructed
verbally and in writing that there were a few statements in the source identification task that were
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solely from the questions and that they should declare where they recalled learning of the items
presented (Ridley & Clifford, 2006).
Ridley and Clifford (2006) found that participants high in state anxiety made fewer
source monitoring errors than participants lower in state anxiety. A multiple regression analysis
was conducted that removed items for which people could not remember the source. The results
of the analysis increased the amount of variance originally accounted for when the items for
which people could not remember the source were included and increased the strength of the
original correlation found between state anxiety and source misattribution errors. When these
forgotten items were excluded, an even stronger positive relationship emerged between state
anxiety and source misattribution errors. The relationship between trait anxiety and source
misattribution errors was nonsignificant and the interaction between state and trait anxiety was
nonsignificant (Ridley & Clifford, 2006).
The literature varies on the relationship between source monitoring and anxiety. Studies
have found different results on whether high anxiety increases or decreases source monitoring
errors. This fact requires further research to be conducted in this area.
The Current Study
The current study examined whether people who are anxious versus nonanxious performed
differently on an eyewitness task when in a state of high versus low anxiety. Only one previous
study (Ridley & Clifford, 2006) has examined whether state and trait anxiety impact eyewitness
performance in adults, but the study asks a different research question than the current study by
nature of the fact that the researchers measured state anxiety after the to-be-remembered event.
The current study asked the question whether highly anxious people who are distressed
following a stressful to-be-remembered event are better at source monitoring. In addition, in the
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previous study, the researchers did not manipulate state anxiety. As a result, the previous study
is confounded by the typical high correlation between state and trait anxiety. Further, the
previous study measured anxiety using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. The current study
examined anxiety utilizing the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire, as it is a measure of
pure anxiety and has the ability to differentiate anxiety from depression (see Reidy & Keogh,
1997; Keogh & Reidy, 2000).
In the current study, 4 groups (high trait, high state; high trait, low state; low trait, high state;
low trait, low state) were formed to represent various combinations of state and trait anxiety.
This combination of groups enabled the researchers to answer the key question about whether
anxiety impacts eyewitness performance when participants are in a high anxious state.
Participants’ anxiety levels were measured using the Mood and Anxiety Symptom
Questionnaire. Participants with high and low anxiety then experienced a high or low (i.e., mood
maintenance) state anxiety manipulation. High state anxiety was induced via an anxious mood
induction prior to presenting the to-be-remembered stimulus materials. Low state anxiety was
maintained via a mood stabilizing induction. As in the Ridley and Clifford (2006) study,
participants were presented with to-be-source monitored information via two methods: (1)
viewing a forensically relevant video and (2) responding to questions designed for the purpose of
presenting information to participants. Next, participants were given a positive mood induction
and additional activities to ensure that the effects of the anxious mood induction no longer
impacted participants when they next participated in a source monitoring task (see also Ridley &
Clifford, 2006 for this task).
The following hypotheses and research questions were addressed by the current study.
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H1: There will be a main effect of trait anxiety, but the direction of the effect will not be
hypothesized.
H2: There will be a main effect of state anxiety. Based on Ridley and Clifford (2006), people
high in state anxiety will make fewer errors on the source monitoring task.
RQ1: Will there be an interaction between trait and state anxiety?
Method
Participants
Participants were 98 West Virginia University undergraduate students. Of the original 98
participants, data from 14participants was excluded due to missing data and/or scores of 4 or
higher on the Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire: Infrequency validity items. An
additional 12 participants’ data were excluded from the analyses because the anxious mood
induction was not effective in increasing their anxiety ratings by at least 1 point on the Emotional
Experiences Questionnaire. Therefore, 72 participants were included in the analyses. Half of the
sample (n = 36) was in the anxious mood induction condition, while the other half was in the
mood stabilizing condition. The number of participants in each group was: high state anxiety,
high trait anxiety (n = 5); high state anxiety, low trait anxiety (n = 31); low state anxiety, high
trait anxiety (n = 13); and low state anxiety, low trait anxiety (n = 23).The majority of
participants were female (79.2%). Ages of participants ranged from 18 to 25 years (M = 20.07,
SD= 1.75).The majority of participants self-identified as non-Hispanic/Caucasian (88.9%), 2.8%
as black/African American, 2.8% as biracial, 2.8% as other, 1.4% as Asian, and 1.4% as
Hispanic/Latino. Broken down by year of college, 26.4% were freshmen, 33.3% were
sophomores, 25% were juniors, and 15.3% were seniors. Participants were tested in groups of
fewer than 8 individuals. If a single participant arrived at the session (n = 20), the participant was
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run individually. Steps were taken to ensure participant privacy during the procedure, including
seating participants several seats away from other participants. Participants were recruited via
West Virginia University’s Research Participation System (SONA), fliers, and in-class
announcements.
Measures
Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (Clark & Watson, 1991).The Mood and
Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire is a 90-item self-report questionnaire. The current study
included 89 of the 90 questions. The question referring to suicidal ideation and behavior was
omitted, due to the fact that research has shown that this question loads on the depression scale,
rather than the anxiety scale.
The Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire consists of three major scales: General
Distress, anxiety-specific (Anxious Arousal), and depression-specific (Anhedonic Depression).
The three-factor structure is supported by several investigations of the factor structure (Watson et
al., 1995a; Watson et al., 1995b; Reidy & Keogh, 1997; Keogh & Reidy, 2000). The General
Distress scale is comprised of three subscales: depressive symptoms, anxious symptoms, and
mixed anxiety-depressive symptoms. Each scale has strong internal consistency, ranging from
0.78 to 0.92 (Buckby, Yung, Cosgrave, & Killackey, 2007). Watson et al. (1995a) examined the
Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire and found that the measures of anxiety and
depression exhibited high convergent validity, with anxious arousal correlating r = .72 on
average with general distress: anxiety and with anhedonic depression correlating r = .70 on
average with general distress: depression. They also found that the anxious arousal and
anhedonic depression scales were strong markers of the constructs they purport to measure, with
general distress: anxiety and general distress: depression sharing 48% of their variance on
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average and with anxious arousal and anhedonic depression sharing only 12% of their variance
on average.
Reidy and Keogh (1997) also examined the discriminant and convergent validity of the
Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire and found that the anxious arousal and anhedonic
depression scales were successfully able to discriminate between anxiety and depression and
exhibited high convergent validity. Anxious arousal correlated strongly (r = .75) with general
distress: anxiety correlated. Anhedonic depression correlated strongly (r = .73) with general
distress: depression. Anxious arousal was correlated moderately (r = .45) with anhedonic
depression showing discriminant validity between anxiety and depression. The scales of the
Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire appear to be able to discriminate nonclinical anxiety
and depression better than scales of other measures (Keogh & Reidy, 2000), such as the widely
used State-Trait Anxiety Inventory.
The Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire was used to identify participants who
were assigned to one of four conditions: high trait anxiety, high state anxiety; high trait anxiety,
low state anxiety; low trait anxiety, high state anxiety; or low trait anxiety, low state anxiety.
Participants who scored 27 or above on the General distress: anxious arousal scale (n = 16) or 25
or above on the General Distress: Anxiety sensitivity scale (n = 2) were assigned to the high trait
anxiety conditions. The mean score on General Distress: Anxious Arousal scale for high trait
anxiety participants was M = 34.72, SD = 7.74, range 27-52 and was M = 22.04, SD= 3.86, range
= 20-25 for low trait anxiety participants. The mean score on the General Distress: Anxiety
Sensitivity Scale for high trait anxiety participants was M = 27.00, SD = 4.31, range = 20-34 and
was M = 17.65, SD = 3.19, range 11-25 for low trait anxiety participants. This cut is based on
means and standard deviations used in previous investigations. Further evidence for utilizing the
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selected Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire cut-off scores is found in the raw data from
Wu and Watson (2005). This data set contains Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire
general distress: anxiety scores for an outpatient sample diagnosed with anxiety disorders (i.e.,
obsessive compulsive disorder).
Demographic questionnaire. This questionnaire included questions regarding
participants’ sex, ethnicity, year in college and family income. The questionnaire also included
questions about whether participants had been diagnosed with learning disabilities, Attention
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and are currently in treatment or have had past treatment
for an anxiety disorder. Participants who had been diagnosed with an anxiety disorder and/or
had previous or current treatment for anxiety were assigned to the low state anxiety condition.
Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire: Infrequency validity items
(Zuckerman, 2002).

There are 10 infrequency validity items on the Zuckerman-Kuhlman

Personality Questionnaire. Inclusion of these items allowed the researchers to identify those
participants who were attempting to present in a socially desirable manner and/or those who
were possibly answering the items haphazardly. Each item endorsed is scored as one point. Data
from participants scoring at least five points on these items were not used in this study due to a
possible invalid response style.
Emotional Experiences Questionnaire (Roisman, Fortuna, & Holland, 2006). This
questionnaire asks participants to rate the strength of 25 positive and negative emotions they may
be experiencing. The emotions being rated include a range of emotions, such as anxiety,
amusement, happiness, and shame, in order to prevent participants from unmasking the
researchers’ intention to manipulate ratings of state anxiety. Participants rated their emotions on
a 9-point Likert scale from 0 (Not at all) to 8 (The most in my life). This questionnaire was
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given before and after the anxious mood and mood stabilizing inductions to allow the researchers
to be able to determine if the inductions were effective. This questionnaire was also given before
the source identification task as a way to check that participants were no longer in a high state on
anxiety while completing the source identification task.
It was expected that participants who received the anxious mood induction would increase
their anxiety rating after the anxious mood induction. For the participants who received the mood
stabilizing induction, it was expected that their pre-post anxiety ratings would not change
significantly.
Mood inductions. The participants experienced either an anxious mood induction or a
mood stabilizing induction. The current study induced state anxiety following the procedures
used by Sinclair, Soldat, and Ryan (1997). This induction procedure was used because it led to
observable changes in the participants’ anxiety levels in multiple studies and because other
anxious mood inductions confound increasing anxiety with the to-be-remembered information.
Anxious mood induction (Sinclair, Soldat, & Ryan, 1997, Study 2). The participants
were given a booklet composed of 59 sheets of paper with one statement typed on a sheet. The
59 statements included were designed to induce anxiety. The participants also received a CD
with the 59 statements read to them at the rate of one per 15 seconds. They were to follow along
in the booklet as they heard the statements read to them on the CD. The CD told participants that
“These statements are designed to make you feel anxious” (Sinclair et al., 1997, p. 168). The
statements started off neutral (“Today is neither better nor worse than any other day.” Sinclair et
al., 1997; p. 171) and became increasingly more anxiety related (“I feel paralyzed with fear—
some very important decisions are almost impossible to make.” Sinclair et al., 1997; p. 173). One
of the 60 statements in the induction was removed because it appeared very early in the sequence
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and was not a neutral item. When the participants reached the end of the booklet, they were told
on the CD, “Now that you’re feeling very anxious, concentrate on this feeling. Feel it getting
stronger and stronger, more and more worried. Let it continue to build…Do and think whatever
you can to build this very anxious mood. Feel very, very anxious. Close your eyes. Begin now”
(Sinclair et al., 1997, p. 168, 173). After two minutes of focusing on increasing the feeling of
anxiety, participants again completed the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire. This induction
procedure was used because it led to observable changes in the participants’ anxiety levels in
multiple studies (Sinclair et al., 1997).
Mood stabilizing induction. The mood stabilizing induction was based upon the mood
induction used in Josephson, Singer, and Salovey (1996) and as such featured a video segment of
This Old House, which is a home-improvement show. The segment was the same length as the
anxious mood induction procedure.
Presentation of the to-be-source monitored information. Participants received
information from two sources—a video and a questionnaire. Participants viewed a 5-minute
portion of a crime video depicting a burglary and a car chase that was used by Chambers and
Zaragoza (2001) and Mitchell, Johnson, and Mather (2003). Later, participants were given a 36item questionnaire (Mitchell et al., 2003) that consists of 3 sections of 12 questions each to allow
participants to review the 12 event components in the video a total of 3 times. Chambers and
Zaragoza (2001) showed that being exposed to misleading information multiple times enhances
the number of source monitoring errors.
Positive mood induction. All participants experienced a positive mood induction in
order to ensure that participants in the high state anxiety conditions were no longer in a state of
high anxiety while they were completing the source identification task. The induction required
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that the participants listen to classical music for approximately 30 minutes. This induction has
previously been shown to effectively induce a positive mood (Roisman, Fortuna, & Holland,
2006).
Filler tasks. Participants engaged in filler tasks for approximately 10 minutes (i.e., word
search) after viewing the to-be-source monitored video. The anxious mood induction has been
shown to last approximately 35 minutes (Sinclair, Soldat, & Ryan, 1997). Therefore, it was
necessary to ensure that approximately 40 minutes had passed from the end of the anxious mood
induction until the time of the Source Identification Questionnaire, in order to be certain that
participants were no longer in a state of high anxiety when they completed the source
identification task. The positive mood induction described above took approximately 30
minutes, thereby necessitating this second 10-minute filler task before the source identification
task.
Source identification task (Mitchell, Johnson, & Mather, 2003). Participants were
given the Source Identification task, which is comprised of 32 statements that asked participants
to decide if the items were seen in the video, appeared in the Source Identification Questionnaire,
appeared in both the video and the Source Identification Questionnaire, or were not presented in
either the video or the Source Identification Questionnaire. Participants were asked to indicate a
response for each item but also to indicate if they were completely unsure/guessed. The
statements were administered on a CD and were spaced 8 seconds apart.
Procedure
See Appendix A for outline of procedure. Participants were recruited via West Virginia
University’s Research Participation System (SONA) and via in-class announcements and fliers.
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Experimental procedures
Four experimenters (3 females, 1 male) ran participants in this study. First, participants
completed the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire to measure trait anxiety and
completed a demographics questionnaire. Participants were then given the infrequency validity
items from the Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire. Participants’ baseline mood was
assessed using the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire. Immediately following completion of
the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire, the demographic questionnaire was reviewed by
the researchers. Any participant who had previous treatment or was currently in treatment for
anxiety was instantly placed in the mood stabilizing induction condition, regardless of the
condition in which the remainder of the group was placed. During that time, participants were
asked to take a break and remain in the back of the room.
Participants who were assigned to the high state anxiety groups were given an anxious
mood induction via computer and participants who were assigned to the low state anxiety groups
were given a mood stabilizing induction via computer. Participants completed a second mood
assessment using the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire to be certain that the anxious and
mood stabilizing inductions were effective. Participants were presented with to-be-source
monitored information via two methods: (1) viewing a forensically relevant video and (2)
responding to a questionnaire. Next, all participants were given a positive mood induction and
filler tasks totaling 40 minutes. They then completed the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire
for a final time to ensure that the effects of the anxious mood induction no longer impacted
participants when they next participated in the source identification task. Finally, participants
completed an eyewitness source identification task that required them to accurately report the
source of previously provided forensically relevant information that was viewed in the video or
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that was presented in the Source Identification Questionnaire. Participants were then verbally
debriefed and asked to not share details of this study with other undergraduate students. All
participants received extra credit, if permitted by their course, for participation in this study. To
encourage participation during a period of low registration numbers for summer classes, payment
of $25 was offered to nine participants in addition to the extra credit.
Results
Mood Manipulation Checks
Anxious mood induction condition. See Table 1. If the anxious mood induction was
effective, a significant increase from Time 1 (baseline) to Time 2 (post anxious mood induction)
would be expected. Therefore, a paired samples t-test using baseline and post-anxious mood
induction ratings on the anxiety item on the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire was
conducted. There was a statistically significant increase in anxiety ratings from Time 1 to Time
2, t (35) = -10.33, p < .0005 (two-tailed). Therefore, the anxious mood induction was effective.
To determine whether anxiety decreased as a result of the positive mood induction and filler
tasks, a paired-samples t-test was conducted on Time 2 to Time 3 (before the source
identification task) anxiety Likert scale ratings on the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire.
There was a statistically significant decrease in anxiety ratings from Time 2 to Time 3, t (35) =
10.11, p < .0005 (two-tailed). The mean decrease in anxiety ratings was 2.97 with a 95%
confidence interval ranging from 2.38 to 3.57. To determine how anxiety levels changed from
Time 1 to Time 3, another paired-samples t-test was performed. Anxiety levels at Time 1
significantly differed from those at Time 3, t (35) = 2.16, p = .04. Anxiety decreased
significantly as a result of the positive mood induction and filler tasks, so participants were no
longer in a high state of anxiety when completing the source identification task. More
specifically, participants were least anxious at the time of the source identification task.
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A paired-samples t-test was performed on Time 1 to Time 2 anxiety Likert scale ratings
on the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire to ensure that participants’ anxiety levels in the
mood stabilizing induction condition did not increase following the induction. The anxiety
ratings at Time 1 were statistically different from the anxiety ratings at Time 2, t (35) = 3.71, p =
.001 (two-tailed). The mean decrease in anxiety ratings was 1.03 with a 95% confidence interval
ranging from .46 to 1.59. Participants were less anxious following the mood stabilizing
induction.
Finally, a paired-samples t-test was also performed for anxiety levels from Time 2 to
Time 3. The anxiety ratings at Time 2 were not statistically different from the anxiety ratings at
Time 3, t (35) = -.44, p = .66 (two-tailed). The mean increase in anxiety ratings was .11 with a
95% confidence interval ranging from -.62 to .40. Participants’ anxiety levels did not
statistically change as a result of the mood stabilizing induction.
Mood stabilizing condition. If the mood stabilization induction was effective, a
significant increase in anxiety from Time 1 (baseline) to Time 2 (post anxious mood induction)
would not be expected. A paired-samples t-test was performed on Time 1 to Time 2 anxiety
Likert scale ratings on the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire to ensure that participants’
anxiety levels in the mood stabilizing induction condition did not increase following the
induction. The anxiety ratings at Time 1 were statistically different from the anxiety ratings at
Time 2, t (35) = 3.71, p = .001 (two-tailed). The mean decrease in anxiety ratings was 1.03 with
a 95% confidence interval ranging from .46 to 1.59. Participants were less anxious following the
mood stabilizing induction.
Finally, a paired-samples t-test was also performed for anxiety levels from Time 2 to
Time 3. The anxiety ratings at Time 2 were not statistically different from the anxiety ratings at
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Time 3, t (35) = -.44, p = .66 (two-tailed). The mean increase in anxiety ratings was .11 with a
95% confidence interval ranging from -.62 to .40. Participants’ anxiety levels did not
statistically change as a result of the mood stabilizing induction.
Of interest, baseline anxiety ratings on the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire
significantly correlated with anxiety scores on the General Distress: Anxious Arousal scale on
the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire, r = .24, p = .04.
State-Trait Anxiety Analyses
See Table 2. To determine the effects of state and trait anxiety on performance on source
identification, a 2 (High vs. Low Trait Anxiety) X 2 (High vs. Low State Anxiety) ANOVA was
conducted with the number of correct source monitoring responses as the dependent variable.
There was a statistically significant main effect for state anxiety, F (1, 68) = 6.02, p =
.02; the effect size was moderate (partial eta squared = .08). High state anxiety increases
accuracy on an eyewitness memory task. Participants who were in a high state of anxiety were
more accurate on the source monitoring task than were those who were in a low state of anxiety.
The main effect for trait anxiety, F (1, 68) = .37, p = .55, did not reach statistical significance. In
this study, clinically significant levels of anxiety did not influence eyewitness memory. The
interaction effect between state and trait anxiety was not statistically significant, F (1, 68) = .38,
p = .54.
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Effects were also examined after removing participants’ guesses on the source
identification task. 1
See Table 3. To examine whether participants performed better on any particular type of
question on the source identification task (questions about the video, the questionnaire, the video
plus questionnaire, or new information), a two-way between-groups multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA) was performed. Four dependent variables were used: to-be-remembered
material from the video only, from both the video and the questionnaire, from neither the video
nor the questionnaire (i.e., new information), and information from the questionnaire only. The
independent variables were state and trait anxiety levels (high vs. low). There was not a
statistically significant state- trait anxiety interaction effect, F (4, 65) = .91, p = .46; Wilks’
Lambda = .95; partial eta squared = .05 nor was there a statistically significant difference
between high and low trait anxiety, F (4, 65) = .57, p = .69; Wilks’ Lambda = .97; partial eta
squared = .03, on the combined dependent variables. However, there was a statistically
significant difference between high and low state anxiety on the combined dependent variables,
F (4, 65) = 2.89, p = .03; Wilks’ Lambda = .85; partial eta squared = .15.
1

A 2 (High vs. Low Trait Anxiety) X 2 (High vs. Low State Anxiety) ANOVA was conducted with the

number of correct source monitoring responses that were not guesses as the dependent variable. The interaction
effect between state and trait anxiety was not statistically significant, F (1, 68) = .00, p = .97. The main effect for
state anxiety, F (1, 68) = 3.54, p = .06, became nonsignificant. The main effect for trait anxiety, F (1, 68) = .02, p =
.90, remained nonsignificant. This analysis was conducted because it was expected that source monitoring was not
being measured if an individual did not have a memory for the event, or in other words, they guessed. However,
these results suggest that participants were not accurate in determining if they were guessing. Therefore, these
results should be interpreted with caution.
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When the results for the 4 dependent variables were considered separately, the only mean
difference that reached statistical significance was the to-be-remembered material from the video
only, F (1, 68) = 10.01, p = .002, partial eta squared = .13. Participants in a high state of anxiety
more accurately remembered information that was only presented in the video than participants
in a low state of anxiety. Surprisingly, there was no significant effect of anxiety on misleading
information presented in the questionnaire which is inconsistent with the previous literature on
anxiety and suggestibility.
Discussion
The current study examined the novel question of whether highly anxious people perform
differently on an eyewitness memory task when they are in a high state of anxiety. In order to
examine this question, this study employed a 2 (high vs. low state) X 2 (high vs. low trait) design
using a source monitoring task as the outcome variable. In the current design, participants were
anxious at encoding of the to-be-remembered event, but were not anxious during the eyewitness
recall task. With a single exception, previous studies on anxiety and eyewitness memory have
limited their designs to include manipulations of state anxiety only or measurement of existing
trait anxiety. The one study that included measurement of state and trait anxiety, measured trait
anxiety before the to-be-remembered event and state anxiety after the to-be-remembered event,
and therefore addressed a different research question.
There was a main effect of state anxiety in the current study such that people who were in
a high state of anxiety as a result of an anxious mood induction that was administered prior to
viewing the to-be-remembered video made fewer errors on the source monitoring task. YerkesDodson’s law (1908) theorizes that moderate levels of anxiety are ideal for cognitive
performance. Levels of anxiety that are too low or too high impair performance. In the current
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study, anxiety was measured immediately following the anxious mood induction and levels were
moderate. This moderate level of anxiety represented a statistically significant increase from a
baseline rating that was taken immediately prior to the mood induction. This suggests that the
anxious mood induction was effective. It is important to point out that participants were no
longer anxious when they completed the source monitoring task as measured by another set of
anxiety ratings given immediately prior to the source monitoring task. The anxious mood
induction employed in the current study lasted for approximately 35 minutes (Sinclair et al.,
1997). The source monitoring eyewitness task was completed approximately 40 minutes after the
end of the anxious mood induction. Filler tasks and a positive mood induction were provided in
the interim time period.
The current study failed to find that trait anxiety impacts eyewitness performance as there
was no main effect of trait anxiety. That is, high levels of general anxiety similar to those of
people with clinically significant anxiety did not influence eyewitness memory. Due to
attentional biases associated with anxiety, it might be expected that an individual high in anxiety
might perform better on an eyewitness task (e.g., Coles et al., 2007). Findings of other research
suggest that people high in anxiety might perform better on an eyewitness task. However,
performance was equivalent. The interaction between state and trait anxiety was also
nonsignificant, and therefore the current study failed to find differences in the performance of
highly anxious individuals in a current state of high anxiety. The nonsignificant findings may be
a result of lack of power given that we only had 5 participants in this group. This group was hard
to fill because for ethical reasons we nonrandomly assigned people who were high in anxiety
who were currently in treatment for an anxiety disorder to the mood stabilizing condition. A
second possible explanation is that the to-be-remembered video depicting the crime was not
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anxiety-provoking. Although the video depicted a robbery and high-speed chase, the video is
nonviolent. Witnessing a crime generally increased an individual’s anxiety level; however, it is
likely that the video did not exert the same influence on the subjects in this study that would be
expected if they witnessed a crime outside of the experimental setting. Therefore, one might
assume that the five participants with clinically significant levels of anxiety who were in a high
state of anxiety would experience a higher level of anxiety in response to the video. However,
these 5 participants had a lower average anxiety score on the Emotional Experiences
Questionnaire after video viewing (M = 3.20, SD = 2.28) than did the 31 participants who had
clinically significant anxiety levels, but who were in a high state of anxiety (M = 3.74, SD =
1.80).
A review of the literature finds that anxious individuals are not more likely than nonanxious individuals to get accurate information correct on source monitoring tasks, but that they
are more likely to get more misleading responses correct. In the current study, participants were
asked to either indicate whether information came from 4 categories: video only, questionnaire
only, video plus questionnaire, or was new and therefore never presented. The information
presented in the questionnaire is conceptualized as misleading information. Therefore, to
examine whether the basic finding of greater eyewitness accuracy in the face of misleading
information replicated in this study, we analyzed responses to the “questionnaire” questions. We
did not find a significant main effect of state anxiety, trait anxiety, or a significant interaction. It
is possible that presenting misinformation in a questionnaire instead of in an in-person interview
did not lend itself to being impacted by anxiety.
Further analyses of responses from the video only, from the questionnaire only, or from
both the video and the questionnaire were competed. Participants who received the anxious
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mood induction were more accurate in response to identifying source monitoring information
presented in the video only than participants who received a neutral mood induction. This
suggests that anxious participants better encoded the video than did the non-anxious participants.
There were no significant effects of trait anxiety or significant interaction. This explanation is
consistent with the Dobson and Markham (1992) findings that high state anxiety at encoding
improves memory performance. Regarding the video plus the questionnaire and the new
information, there were no significant main effects or interactions, but the pattern of means was
in the expected direction with high state anxiety participants having means indicating slightly
higher accuracy.
In general, the results of this study do not converge with previous findings in the memory
literature which suggests that anxiety impairs memory performance (e.g., Kaye et al, 1953).
Rather, these results converge more closely with previous findings in the suggestibility literature
and in the memory literature in which potentially threatening information is presented showing
that high anxiety is linked to reduced suggestibility or greater accuracy. In this study, high state
anxiety was associated with fewer source monitoring errors. Although the findings of the current
study directly replicate the findings of Ridley and Clifford (2006), who also found effects of high
state anxiety but no effect of high trait anxiety and no significant interaction, the method does
not allow for direct comparisons to be drawn. State anxiety was measured after the to-beremembered video.
A major strength of the current study is the fact that the anxious mood induction was not
confounded with to-be-remembered material or the memory interview itself. Instead, state
anxiety was manipulated prior to presentation of the to-be-remembered material and checks were
used to determine the effectiveness of the anxious mood induction to ensure that participants
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were more anxious at the time of encoding rather than during any other time throughout the
experiment. Additionally, the current study utilized the Mood and Anxiety Symptom
Questionnaire, which is a measure of pure anxiety that is able to differentiate between depression
and anxiety, unlike the commonly used State-Trait Anxiety Inventory which measures distress
rather than anxiety.
A limitation to the study is the lack of practice items that would have allowed the
researchers to screen for lack of understanding of the source monitoring task. Some participants
performed at or below chance level on the source monitoring tasks and without those screening
items, it is impossible to determine whether participants completely understood the task
directions.
In sum, in this study, clinically significant levels of anxiety did not influence eyewitness
memory. However, being anxious during encoding is associated with more accurate recall on a
source monitoring task. In addition, clinically significant levels of anxiety do not interact with
state anxiety to produce differences in source identification accuracy.
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Table 1
Mean anxiety ratings on the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire across conditions and time
Mood Induction Condition

T1

T2

T3

Anxious

1.03 (1.03)a

3.67 (1.85)b

.69 (1.04)c

Mood Stabilizing

2.25 (2.18)

1.22 (1.87)

1.33 (2.16)

Notes. N = 72. Means within rows not sharing the same subscript are significantly different
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics for main and interaction effects on total correct source monitoring
Mean

SE

95% CI
Lower

Upper

Bound Bound
Main effects
Low Trait Anxiety

16.99

.61

15.77

18.20

High Trait Anxiety

17.79

1.16

15.46

20.11

Low State Anxiety

15.78

.77

14.25

17.31

High State Anxiety

19.00

1.07

16.87

21.12

Interaction effects
Low Trait, Low State Anxiety
Low Trait, High State Anxiety

High Trait, Low State Anxiety

High Trait, High State Anxiety

Note. N = 72.

15.78

.92

13.94

17.62

18.19

.79

16.61

19.78

14.77

1.23

13.32

18.22

19.80

1.98

15.85

23.75
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics for source monitoring question type
Mean

SE

95% CI
Lower
Bound

Upper
Bound

Main effects
Low Trait Anxiety
Video Only

6.04

.25

5.54

6.54

4.95

.24

4.47

5.43

New Information

3.35

.14

3.08

3.62

Misleading Information

2.65

.28

2.09

3.21

Video Only

6.38

.48

5.43

7.33

Both Video and Questionnaire

4.71

.46

3.78

5.63

New Information

3.42

.26

2.90

3.94

Misleading Information

3.29

.54

2.22

4.35

5.36

.31

4.73

5.99

Both Video and Questionnaire

High Trait Anxiety

Low State Anxiety
Video Only
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Both Video and Questionnaire

4.68

.31

4.07

5.29

New Information

3.16

.17

2.82

3.50

Misleading Information

2.58

.35

1.88

3.28

Video Only

7.06

.44

6.19

7.93

Both Video and Questionnaire

4.98

.42

4.14

5.83

New Information

3.61

.24

3.13

4.08

Misleading Information

3.35

.49

2.37

4.33

High State Anxiety

Interaction effects
Low Trait, Low State Anxiety

Video Only

5.57

.38

4.81

6.32

Both Video and Questionnaire

4.74

.37

4.01

5.47

New Information

3.09

.21

2.68

3.50

Misleading Information

2.39

.42

1.55

3.24
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Low Trait, High State Anxiety
Video Only

6.52

.33

5.87

7.16

Both Video and Questionnaire

5.16

.32

4.53

5.79

New Information

3.61

.18

3.26

3.97

Misleading Information

2.90

.37

2.17

3.63

Video Only

5.15

.50

4.15

6.15

Both Video and Questionnaire

4.62

.49

3.64

5.59

New Information

3.23

.28

2.68

3.78

Misleading Information

2.77

.56

1.64

3.90

Video Only

7.60

.81

5.99

9.21

Both Video and Questionnaire

4.80

.79

3.23

6.37

New Information

3.60

.44

2.72

4.48

Misleading Information

3.80

.91

1.99

5.62

High Trait, Low State Anxiety

High Trait, High State Anxiety

Note. N = 72.
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APPENDIX A

Procedure
1. Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire
2. Demographic Questionnaire
3. Infrequency Validity Items from the Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire
4. Emotional Experiences Questionnaire
5. Anxious Mood Induction or Mood Stabilizing Induction
6. Emotional Experiences Questionnaire
7. To-be-source monitored information
8. Filler Task
9. Positive Mood Induction
10. Emotional Experiences Questionnaire
11. Source Identification Questionnaire
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